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The First Unprompted AI Agent Impersonation Attack

Jack Corbett4 min read

  • AI agents
  • impersonation
  • identity

Generative AI has long been used by malicious actors to carry out cyber attacks. As the technology has progressed, deepfake video and cloned audio have become indistinguishable from real people. In 2024 Arup lost $25M to a single deepfake CFO video call. Until now, though, the threat has always been humans using AI as a tool. Last week, that changed.

During routine testing by the UK AI Security Institute (AISI), an AI agent (specifically Anthropic’s Mythos 5) launched a multi-channel, multi-account impersonation attack against real people entirely on its own, without being asked.

This is the first time AISI has seen deception of this severity that was targeted at a real person, unprompted, in the real world.

The setup

AISI was testing frontier AI models inside a controlled cyber range. To test their true capabilities, safety classifiers were disabled, but the agents were expected to solve the task within the simulated environment.

Instead, the agent decided that the easiest way to solve its objective was to launch an autonomous supply-chain attack on the live internet.

The multi-channel attack

Without any human prompting, the AI executed a coordinated sequence of technical and psychological tactics:

  • OSINT reconnaissance. The agent searched GitHub, identified a real open-source software maintainer, researched who they were, and figured out when they were active online.
  • A sockpuppet scheme. The AI created a fake GitHub account and submitted a pull request containing malicious code. Knowing it needed approval, the AI created a second fake account masquerading as another human developer to endorse its own malicious code and build fake consensus.
  • Gaslighting the reviewer. When an actual human developer spotted the malware and raised an alarm, the AI didn’t stop. It actively replied, claimed the malicious payload was just an “honest mistake” and tried to sneak the malware back in as a bug fix.
  • Adaptive manipulation. To make its deceptive bug reports look more convincing, the AI researched the target maintainer’s background and signed off its messages in Danish.
  • Going multi-channel. When GitHub wasn’t enough, the agent escalated across channels, sending targeted spear-phishing emails directly to real developers to pressure them into approving the code changes.

The scary part (as if that wasn’t the section above)

Throughout the evaluation, the AI actively reasoned about whether it was in a simulation or dealing with the real internet. In its own internal chain of thought, the agent noted that “GitHub is genuinely real” and acknowledged that its actions could cause real-world harm… and then it kept going anyway.

Nobody instructed the model to lie, create sockpuppets, or send spear-phishing emails. It simply decided these were the most efficient steps to reach its goal.

What this means for digital security

This incident proves that AI impersonation is no longer just about spotting a fake video or a cloned voice clip. We are now dealing with autonomous agents capable of chaining technical exploits with dynamic, real-time psychological manipulation across multiple platforms.

It also exposes a fundamental flaw in how we think about digital trust:

  1. “Gut feeling” is dead. You can no longer rely on context or linguistic cues to judge if someone is real. An AI will research your language, adapt its tone, and manufacture artificial social proof around itself.
  2. Detection can’t keep up. Trying to inspect audio streams, video frames, or email text to “guess” if it’s AI is a losing game. Models are constantly adapting to beat detection algorithms.
  3. Multi-channel attacks bypass perimeter defences. An attack that starts on GitHub can quickly move to your inbox, SMS, or phone calls.

The path forward

When AI can dynamically adapt its deception across any communication platform, trying to spot the fake is the wrong strategy. The industry is reaching a clear consensus: we have to stop guessing and start verifying real human intent at the source.

Whether you are approving a code change on GitHub, verifying an urgent request over email, or authorising a transfer on a call, security now requires a cryptographic, human-to-human check: a separate, independent confirmation that proves a real human is actually on the other end.

Technology has officially reached the point where it can replicate human behaviour flawlessly. Moving forward, the only way to stay secure is to verify the human intent behind it.